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Abstract
This paper examines the Stackelberg equilibrium for public input competition and
compares it with the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. Given two asymmetric regions,
we show that under the Nash equilibrium, the more productive region tends to spend
more on public input, which results in this region attracting more capital than the less
productive region. The comparison of the two equilibria reveals that the leader region
obtains a first-mover advantage under the Stackelberg setting. This suggests that if
regions interact with each other sequentially as in the Stackelberg equilibrium, then
the regional disparity that is due to the heterogeneity of productivity is likely to be
mitigated or enlarged, depending on which region performs the leadership role in the
competition process.
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1 Introduction
The past several decades have witnessed a growing interest in the study of how competi-
tion for capital influences governments’ choices of fiscal policies. The standard argument,
which originates in the fundamental work of Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) and Wilson
(1986), has been that competition through taxation leads to inefficiently low tax rates. On
the contrary, if competition is conducted through the use of public input that enhances the
productivity of private capital, an overemphasis on that policy is commonly expected to
emerge (Keen and Marchand, 1997; Bayindir-Upmann, 1998; Bucovetsky, 2005).1 Despite
providing valuable insights into the nature of competition among governments, these results
have been generally obtained under a non-cooperative game framework in which compet-
ing units move simultaneously. However, as challenged by Wang (1999) and Kempf and
Rota-Graziosi (2010), the relevance of the non-cooperative hypothesis for the study of fiscal
competition has not yet been established in reality.2 Relaxing this hypothesis to investigate
a scenario in which competition is conducted in a sequential game framework, both studies
show that the downward pressure on tax rates is indeed less strong than predicted in the
standard tax competition analysis—in a large part that is due to the property of strategic
complementarity of tax rates across the competing units. More specifically, when the com-
peting units follow a sequence of moves in setting their tax rates, the second moving region
(the “Stackelberg follower”) will increase its tax rate if it observes a higher level of tax rate
chosen by the first moving region (the “Stackelberg leader”); the leader anticipates this and
consequently increases its tax rate. As a result, the selected tax rates in both regions in the
1Numerous subsequent works have extended and refined these arguments in a variety of directions. See
Dembour (2008) for a survey of literature on competitive location policies. For surveys of the tax competition
literature in general, see Wilson (1999) and Wilson and Wildasin (2004).
2Due to the complexity of the strategic interaction of competing units, it has indeed never been clarified
in the literature which game setting, either simultaneous or sequential, is a better approximation of reality.
In some cases, it is conceivable that the smaller regions make their strategic responses after they observe
the actions chosen by the larger regions. In other cases, the difference between core versus periphery regions
may also translate into strategic asymmetries. The empirical literature, on the other hand, does provide
some evidence on the presence of Stackelberg-type leaders in tax competition across regions and countries
(e.g., Altshuler and Goodspeed, 2002; de Mello, 2008).
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Stackelberg equilibrium are higher than that in the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium.
This paper adds to this literature by asking whether the different outcomes implied by
the varied game settings for tax rate setting can be generalized to the case of competition
through public input. More specifically, we investigate the Stackelberg equilibrium for public
input competition and compare it with the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. For simplicity
and tractability, our model assumes: (i) that regions that are heterogeneous in productivity
compete for mobile capital by providing a productivity-enhancing public input; and (ii) that
the capital tax rate is coordinated by the social planner and so it is no longer a policy
instrument for competition. These two assumptions, which are similar to those of Cai and
Treisman (2005), presents the advantage of focusing exclusively on the strategic interactions
for public input among regions and enables us to simplify the comparison between the two
equilibria. Given that the underlying mechanisms through which tax rates and public inputs
are utilized to attract capital are different, our results reveal somewhat non-comparable
outcomes between these two tools of competition. In particular, we show that the public
input is a strategic substitute among the competing units in the public input competition
model—a feature that differs from the case of tax competition, where tax rates are strategic
complements. These different features of the two competition tools finally transform into a
different comparison outcome between the Stackelberg equilibrium and the Nash equilibrium
for public input competition and tax competition. More specifically, we find that in the case
of public input competition under the Stackelberg equilibrium it is important to differentiate
the leader region and the follower region—while the leader region tends to set a higher level
of public input than what this region would select in the Nash equilibrium, the follower
region does the opposite. This result differs from the case of tax competition found in the
previous literature that suggests a consistent upward selection of tax rates in both types of
region under the Stackelberg equilibrium.3
The rest of this note is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model. Section
3See Kempf and Rota-Graziosi (2010) for the comparison of the Stackelberg equilibrium and Nash equi-
librium for competition through tax rates.
2
3 proceeds with the equilibrium analysis in both game settings and compares the equilibrium
outcomes. Section 4 concludes.
2 The model
Consider an economy that consists of two regions, i = 1, 2. In each region, a numeraire
output is produced under perfect competition, and this output can be used either for private
consumption or government consumption. The production function in each region is given
by Fi(Li, Ki, Ii), where Ki is the amount of perfectly mobile capital, Ii is the amount of
public input provided by the regional government that enhances the productivity of domestic
capital,4 and Li is the amount of a fixed production factor such as land or labor. For
analytical convenience the fixed factor is normalized to unity and the production function
can be rewritten as Fi(Ki, Ii), which is increasing, twice continuously differentiable and
concave in the level of capital Ki; i.e.,
∂Fi
∂Ki
> 0 > ∂
2Fi
∂K2i
. Domestic capital and public input are
complements, so an increased provision of public input increases the marginal productivity
of capital, i.e., ∂
2Fi
∂Ki∂Ii
> 0. The cost of public input provision is given by the convex function
Ci(Ii), which, for analytical tractability, is assumed to be quadratic: Ci(Ii) =
I2i
2
.
In each region, public input is financed by a source-based specific tax on capital t, which is
coordinated by the social planner and therefore cannot be a policy instrument for the regions.
By assuming this we are able to focus exclusively on the nature of public input competition
and its impact on public input provision. Private capital is perfectly mobile and the total
fixed stock of private capital in the economy is assumed equal to K¯; the market clearing
conditions imply that the allocation of capital across the regions equates its net return in
4Although the magnitude of the output elasticity of public input is still under debate, the literature has
reached a broad consensus on the argument that public input is truly productivity-enhancing; see Duarte Bom
and Ligthart (2008), Ligthart and Martin-Suarez (2011) for a quantitative review of the literature on the
productivity of public input.
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the two regions; that is 
∂F1
∂K1
− t = ∂F2
∂K2
− t
K1 +K2 = K¯
(1)
where the net return of capital is assumed to be positive in order to ensure a non-zero
allocation of capital in each region, i.e. ∂Fi
∂Ki
− t > 0. To complete the model, we assume that
the objective of each region is to maximize the sum of the fixed factor income and capital
tax revenue, net of the investment costs5
Wi(Ii, Ij) = Fi(Ki, Ii)−Ki ∂Fi
∂Ki
+ tKi − Ci(Ii), j 6= i (2)
In our model, the two regions are assumed to be asymmetric with respect to their initial
productivity which, however, can be mitigated and possibly eliminated by the regions’ choices
of public input. More precisely, following Bucovetsky (1991), Grazzini and Van Ypersele
(2003) and Hindriks et al. (2008), we assume a quadratic specification of the production
function, which is well behaved over its increasing range and allows us to introduce several
simplifications.6 Specifically, the production functions are given by
 F1(K1, I1) = (a+ δ + I1)K1 −
b
2
K21
F2(K2, I2) = (a− δ + I2)K2 − b2K22
(3)
where b > 1 is the rate of decline of the marginal product of capital with the amount
of capital invested in the region; technology parameter a is assumed to be sufficient large
relative to b, which ensures a positive level of production and the standard properties of the
production function; and the parameter δ > 0 captures the degree of production asymmetry
across regions, with region 1 assumed to have a superior production technology than region
5We assume there is no domestic ownership of capital. This assumption, which is consistent with Wildasin
(1988), has been used by Hauptmeier et al. (2008), Hindriks et al. (2008), Kempf and Rota-Graziosi (2010).
As argued by Laussel and Le Breton (1998), this assumption can be justified as a partial equilibrium reflecting
the high concentration of countries’ capital distribution.
6In our simple context, there is little to be gained from using a more general production function form.
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2.
From equations (1) and (3), we immediately get that
 K1 =
I1−I2
2b
+ K¯
2
+ δ
b
K2 =
I2−I1
2b
+ K¯
2
− δ
b
(4)
Therefore, the stock of capital in each region is increasing in its own public input provision
and decreasing in the public input provision of the other region. In particular, given equal
provision of public input, i.e. I1 = I2, region 1 will attract more capital than its counterpart.
3 Nash equilibrium vs. Stackelberg equilibrium
In this section we examine the regions’ equilibrium choices, depending on the sequence of gov-
ernment actions. We first analyze the Nash equilibrium where both regions simultaneously
decide how much public input to provide. Then we derive the Stackelberg equilibrium by
setting one region (the leader) to make the provision decision before the other (the follower)
does. Finally, a comparison of the two equilibria follows.
3.1 Nash equilibrium
In this case, each region chooses its own public input level independently. Given Ij, the
problem of region i is to choose Ii in order to maximize its welfare function (2). The FOC
yields
∂Wi
∂Ii
=
∂Fi
∂Ii
+ (
∂2Fj
∂K2j
Ki + t)
∂Ki
∂Ii
− ∂Ci
∂Ii
= 0, j 6= i (5)
With production functions (3), it is straightforward to show that the Nash equilibrium
(IN1 , I
N
2 ) is jointly determined by 
K1
2
− I1 + t2b = 0
K2
2
− I2 + t2b = 0
(6)
5
In addition, the second order condition is satisfied at (IN1 , I
N
2 ), i.e. −1 < ∂
2Wi
∂I2i
= 1
4b
−1 <
0, which guarantees the existence and the uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium.7 Combining
equations (4) and (6) to solve the equilibrium, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 1.The Nash equilibrium requires a higher level of public input and capital in
the more productive region: IN1 =
K¯
4
+ t
2b
+ δ
2b−1 > I
N
2 =
K¯
4
+ t
2b
− δ
2b−1 ;K
N
1 =
K¯
2
+ 2δ
2b−1 >
KN2 =
K¯
2
− 2δ
2b−1 .
The explanation is simple. Since the capital tax rate is fixed across regions, the Nash
equilibrium requires allocating capital so as to equate the marginal product of capital across
regions. Due to the heterogeneity of regional productivity and given other things being
equal, the marginal product of capital is higher in the more productive region (i.e. region
1). Then the decline of marginal product of capital requires allocating more capital to the
more productive region. Furthermore, the equilibrium level of investment in public input is
determined by the equivalence between its marginal revenue and its marginal cost. Since
the more productive region receives more capital, it also exhibits higher marginal value of
investment, and thus also undertakes higher public input investment.
3.2 Stackelberg equilibrium
Let us consider the equilibrium under the Stackelberg game. Assuming that region i is the
leader in the game, and region j is the follower, we solve this game backwards. Given the
leader’s choice Ii, the maximization problem of the follower j is similar to the case of a
non-cooperative game, the usual FOC of the follower obtains
Kj
2
− Ij(Ii) + t
2b
= 0 (7)
7Note that it is assumed that b > 1.
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where Ij(Ii) is the best response function of the follower with respect to the choice of the
leader.
Now given the follower’s best response function Ij(Ii), the leader incorporates this reac-
tion function into its maximization problem, and the corresponding FOC after simplification
is given by
Ki
2
− Ii + t
2b
− (Ki
2
+
t
2b
)
∂Ij
∂Ii
= 0 (8)
Since the derivation of
∂Wj
∂Ij
with respect to Ii and Ij yields
∂2Wj
∂Ij∂Ii
= − 1
4b
and
∂2Wj
∂I2j
= 1
4b
−1,
respectively, applying the Envelop Theorem to equation (7) we obtain
∂Ij
∂Ii
= −
∂2Wj
∂Ij∂Ii
∂2Wj
∂I2j
=
1
1− 4b < 0 (9)
With (9), equation (8) can be further simplified to
2b
4b− 1Ki − Ii +
2t
4b− 1 = 0 (10)
The Stackelberg equilibrium of public input (ILi , I
F
j ) is therefore jointly determined by equa-
tions (7) and (10). Meanwhile, equation (9) implies the following Lemma.
Lemma 1. Public input performs as a strategic substitute.
This is so because when region i increases its level of public input, it increases the
competitive pressure on region j as this decision increases the incentive of capital to relocate
from j to i. The marginal benefit derived from an increase of public input set by region
j is decreasing since it generates fewer revenues than the additional costs for providing
it. Therefore, the optimal response for region j is to reduce its own level of public input.
Mathematically, this is reflected by the negative sign of the second order cross-derivative, i.e.
∂2Wj
∂Ij∂Ii
= − 1
4b
< 0, which implies that when region i increases its provision of public input, it
7
is optimal for region j to decrease its provision of public input in order to increase its overall
welfare.
3.3 Comparison of the two equilibria
In this subsection, we compare the Stackelberg equilibrium to the Nash equilibrium and
summarize our results in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. The follower region selects a lower level of public input in the Stackelberg
equilibrium than what this region would select in the Nash equilibrium, while the leader region
does the opposite: IFj < I
N
j ; I
L
i > I
N
i .
Proof. From the definition of Stackelberg equilibrium, we have
Wi(I
L
i , I
F
j (I
L
i )) = Max
Ii
Wi(Ii, I
F
j (Ii)) > Wi(INi , IFj (INi )) = Wi(INi , INj ) (11)
since ∂Wi
∂Ij
= −Ki
2
− t
2b
< 0, if we assume by contradiction that inequality IFj (I
L
i ) > INj holds,
then we get
Wi(I
N
i , I
N
j ) = Max
Ii
Wi(Ii, I
N
j ) > Wi(ILi , INj ) > Wi(ILi , IFj ) (12)
Obviously, inequality (12) contradicts to (11). That means IFj (I
L
i ) > INj cannot hold, and
thus we have IFj < I
N
j .
Given that IFj < I
N
j and Lemma 1 (i.e.
∂Ij
∂Ii
< 0), the comparison of the two equilibria
(INi , I
N
j ) and (I
L
i , I
F
j ) immediately concludes with I
L
i > I
N
i . 
This proposition identifies the first-mover advantage of the leader region in the sense that
a region will select a higher level of public input and end up with a higher level of payoff
if it acts as the leader by comparison to the situation where the counterpart region acts as
the leader.8 Intuitively, this result can be explained as follows. In the Nash framework, each
8As explicitly proven by Varian(1992, pp.297-298), under the conditions (which are satisfied in our model)
that: (i) the objective function Wi(Ii, Ij) is a strictly decreasing function of Ij (i.e.
∂Wi
∂Ij
= (−∂2Fi
∂K2i
+ t)∂Ki∂Ij <
0), and (ii) the best response function of a region with respect to the other region is strictly decreasing
8
region chooses its level of public input independently, and tends to ignore the negative exter-
nality that it would cause on the tax base of the other region when it raises its public input.
Thus, the Nash provision of public input in each region is determined by maximizing its own
welfare without considering the other region’s action. In contrast, under the Stackelberg
framework, the follower will reduce its public input if it observes a higher public input level
chosen by the leader;9 the leader anticipates this and consequently increases its own public
input. As a result, the leader’s provision of public input in the Stackelberg equilibrium is
higher than in the Nash equilibrium; while at the same time the follower selects a level of
public input in the Stackelberg equilibrium that is lower than the level selected in the Nash
equilibrium.
3.4 Policy implications and numerical solutions
Proposition 1 highlights an important result obtained by Cai and Treisman (2005). Due to
the heterogeneity of regional productivity, competition for capital leads to an asymmetric
outcome with the more productive region spending more on public input and attracting
more capital than the less productive region. Consequently, any existing regional disparity
is anticipated to get larger in a decentralized economy with heterogeneous competing re-
gions. If the continued disadvantage in attracting capital is deemed undesirable in the less
productive region, there is a need to consider some policies through which this situation
can be mitigated or even reversed. In this regard, Proposition 2 suggests a possible solu-
tion. The less productive region may take advantage by trying to become the first mover
in the public input competition, and so utilizing the first-mover advantage to offset some of
(i.e. equation (9) ), a region’s equilibrium payoff in the Stackelberg game is larger if it is the leader than
if the counterpart region is the leader. The exact proof process is similar to what we provided as proof for
proposition 2, thus it is not duplicated in this paper. However, this result is shown numerically in the next
subsection.
9The reason for this reaction is due to the property of strategic substitution of public input between
regions, which is given by Lemma 1. It should be noted that this is the key to drive asymmetric policy
responses for the two regions in the Stackelberg game when public input is employed as the tool for compe-
tition. As a comparison, in the case of tax competition, tax rates are shown to be strategic complements,
which implies that under the Stackelberg game the follower region will increase its tax rate if it observes a
higher level of tax rate chosen by the leader region, leading to a similar policy response of the two regions.
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the competitive disadvantage that is generated by the preexisting heterogeneity of regional
productivity.
In order to illustrate this point more vividly, we conduct some numerical simulations,
based on the following settings. The stock of total capital is fixed at 100, the technology
parameter a is set at 50, the decline rate of marginal product of capital b is set at 2, and the
capital tax rate t is set at 20%. Then, the degree of production asymmetry across regions δ
is increased in steps from 1 up to 10, and the two equilibria are computed for each case. The
results are presented in Figure 1. As characterized in Proposition 1, the upper half of Figure 1
shows that under the Nash equilibrium, an increase in the degree of production asymmetry
leads to an increase in the gap of investment in public input (and so capital allocation)
between regions 1 and 2. Turning to the Stackelberg equilibrium, Figure 1 shows that for
whichever a region is assumed to be the leader in the competition, its resulting selection of
public input (and so capital received) are always higher than the corresponding levels under
the Nash equilibrium, which reflects the outcomes summarized in Proposition 2. In support
of our above policy suggestion, when region 2 is the leader (i.e. the upper half of Figure
1(b)), and the degree of production asymmetry is relatively low, i.e. δ < 6, the competing
disadvantage of region 2 in a non-cooperative competition framework is completely reversed;
while in other cases with larger degrees of production asymmetry, the gap between regions 1
and 2’s choices of public input and capital received is mitigated. Nevertheless, it should also
be noted that if the opposite is observed—region 1 is the leader (i.e. the upper half of Figure
1(a)), then the effect of the heterogeneity of regional productivity will be strengthened, which
eventually leads to an even larger regional gap in terms of the regions’ choices of public input
and capital received.
3.5 Further discussion
The previous results highlight the importance of identifying the potential leadership in the
public input competition game, as it does not only matter for the policy choice of the regions
10
22
24
26
28
30
32
(a). Nash vs. Stackelberg (Region 1 as Leader)
e
I i
Nash: Region 1
Nash: Region 2
Stackelberg: Region 1 (leader)
Stackelberg: Region 2 (follower)
22
24
26
28
(b). Nash vs. Stackelberg (Region 2 as Leader)
e
I i
Nash: Region 1
Nash: Region 2
Stackelberg: Region 1 (follower)
Stackelberg: Region 2 (leader)
0 2 4 6 8 10
16
00
20
00
24
00
28
00
δ
W
i
Nash: Region 1
Nash: Region 2
Stackelberg: Region 1 (leader)
Stackelberg: Region 2 (follower)
0 2 4 6 8 10
18
00
22
00
26
00
δ
W
i
Nash: Region 1
Nash: Region 2
Stackelberg: Region 1 (follower)
Stackelberg: Region 2 (leader)
Figure 1: Basic Simulation Results
but also affect the ultimate pattern of regional development in the economy. Hence, it would
be relevant to answer the following two questions. First, from a regional perspective, which
region (the more productive region or the less productive region) has a larger incentive to
become the leader? Second, from the social planner’s perspective, is it necessary for the social
planner to intervene the timing dimension of the game if a Stackelberg type of competition
is in place?
3.5.1 Equilibrium payoff functions
Before we proceed to explore the above two questions more thoroughly, let us first derive the
equilibrium payoff functions for both regions in both Nash and Stackelberg game settings,
which will serve as the basis for our analysis.
Substituting the production functions (3), the cost function, and the corresponding Nash
and Stackelberg equilibria of public input and capital into equation (2), we obtain the equi-
11
librium payoff functions
 W
N
1 =
4b−1
2
( K¯
4
+ t
2b
+ δ
2b−1)
2 − t2
2b
WN2 =
4b−1
2
( K¯
4
+ t
2b
− δ
2b−1)
2 − t2
2b
(13)
and
 W
L
1 =
[(2−4b)(bK¯+2t)−8bδ]2
8b(16b2−12b+1) − t
2
2b
W F2 =
(4b−1)[(3−4b)(bk¯+2t)+(4b−1)2δ]2
2(16b2−12b+1)2 − t
2
2b
or
 W
F
1 =
(4b−1)[(3−4b)(bk¯+2t)+(1−4b)2δ]2
2(16b2−12b+1)2 − t
2
2b
WL2 =
[(2−4b)(bK¯+2t)+8bδ]2
8b(16b2−12b+1) − t
2
2b
(14)
where (WN1 ,W
N
2 ) is the Nash equilibrium payoff functions, and (W
L
1 ,W
F
2 ) and (W
F
1 ,W
L
2 )
are the Stackelberg equilibrium payoff functions for regions 1 and 2, each being alternatively
the leader. Confirming what we found above regarding the effects of the heterogeneity of
initial productivity and the first-mover advantage of the leader region in the Stackelberg
setting, the simulated payoff functions in the bottom half of Figure 1 show that the larger
is the heterogeneity of initial productivity, δ, the more divergence is the regional payoffs;
and for whichever region serves as the leader in the Stackelbeg game, it obtains a higher
payoff than what it would obtain under a Nash setting while the follower region achieves the
opposite.10
3.5.2 Regions’ choice
The answer to the first question regarding the regions’ incentives to become a leader is di-
rectly related to the potential gains of being a leader or the potential losses of becoming a
follower in the competition. Therefore, we define the “leader’s premium” as the difference
between the Stackelberg equilibrium payoff for region i being a leader and the Nash equi-
10It is also noticeable from Figure 1 that the extra payoffs for a region to be a leader appears to be smaller
in magnitude than the losses of the same region to be a follower in the competition.
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librium payoff for the same region (i.e. WLi −WNi , i = 1, 2), and we define the “follower’s
loss” as the difference between the Nash equilibrium payoff for region j and the Stackelberg
equilibrium payoff for the same region being a follower (i.e. WNj −W Fj , j 6= i). Next, based
on the above assumed parameter values, we simulate both the “leader’s premium” and the
“follower’s loss” by alternatively considering regions 1 and 2 as the leader. The results are
depicted in Figure 2. As shown, the results clearly suggest that the premium for region 1 to
be the leader is relatively larger than the corresponding premium that region 2 can obtain if
it is the leader; at the same time, the potential loss for region 1 being a follower is also larger
than what region 2 would lose if it is the follower. In addition, these disparities between the
two regions are increasing in the regional heterogeneity of initial productivity. An important
implication from these exercises is that region 1—the more productive region—would appear
to have a relatively larger incentive to become the leader as it can obtain a higher level of
premiums or avoid a larger loss of payoff. In an economy with potential intervention from
the social planner, this also means that the more productive region would be willing to pay
more to be the leader if that was required.
3.5.3 Social planner’s choice
As the main policy message conveyed by the analysis above, the selection of who becomes
the leader may become a possible tool to remedy regional disparities that are caused by
the heterogeneity in initial productivity. This can be achieved by ensuring that the less
productive region moves first in the competition. However, which region actually is the
leader would presumably depend on historical factors and the possible intervention from the
social planner. This brings us to our second question regarding whether the social planer
has the incentives to intervene the timing dimension of the competition game.
The answer to this question is at least partially related to the type of social planner we
have—for example, in a broad sense, whether the social planner is a Utilitarian type or a
Rawlsian type. Below, we consider these two extreme cases. We define the objective function
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Figure 2: Leader’s Premium and Follower’s Loss
of a Utilitarian social planner as that maximizes the summation of the equilibrium payoff
of both regions; and define the objective function of a Rawlsain social planner as one that
minimizes the difference of the equilibrium payoff between the two regions. We present the
simulated results for both Nash and Stackelberg equilibriums (considering regions 1 and 2
alternatively as the leader) in Figure 3. Focusing first on the Utilitarian social planner, Figure
3(a) indicates that in the Nash case, maintaining a mechanism to ensure both regions move
simultaneously would achieve the highest social welfare; while provided that the Stackelbeg
type of competition is in place, ensuring region 1 to move first would lead to a better outcome
as it induces more capital moving from the less productive region to the more productive
region. On the contrary, as shown in Figure 3(b), the best choice for a Rawlsian type of social
planner appears to ensure the less productive region to become the leader in the competition
as it induces more capital to be allocated to the less productive regions, which ultimately
reduces regional disparity.
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4 Concluding remarks
Inspired by some recent work that revisited tax rate competition under a Stackelberg game
framework, this paper extends the analysis to the case of competition through public input.
Given two asymmetric regions, we show that public input is a strategic substitute among
the competing regions in the public input competition model. A further comparison of the
Stackelberg equilibrium and Nash equilibrium suggests an asymmetric outcome for the leader
region and the follower region: while the leader region sets a higher level of public input under
the former game setting than the latter, the follower region does the opposite. In addition,
under a non-cooperative game framework, we echoed an important result found in some
previous studies—the more productive region tends to select a higher level of public input,
which results in attracting more capital than the less productive region. A key policy message
that follows from our findings is that the competing disadvantage of the less productive region
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can be mitigated (enlarged) when we allow regions to behave in a Stackelberg fashion and let
the less productive region (the more productive region) to be the leader in the competition
game.
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